Khalifa Hafter, eastern Libya’s strong man, may be poised to take control of two major oilfields in the south of the country, which along with the major production in the east, will place some 90 percent of all Libyan output under his control.

Hafter’s Libyan National Army is currently moving towards the Sharara and El Fil (Elephant) fields, the first shut down since December after being occupied by members of the inappropriately-named Petroleum Facilities Guard. The decision to lock in the field was made by Mustafa Sanalla, head of the National Oil Corporation, a hard-headed technocrat who, despite all the violent unrest, has nevertheless managed to boost national production past a million barrels a day.

After the PFG seizure of the Sharara field, Faiez Serraj, the UN-backed head of the Presidency Council flew in to talk to the protestors. The largely-Tuareg members of the 30th battalion of the PFG had a range of issues not least that they had not been paid since 2014. But the real grievance, which the local PFG reflects, is the long-standing neglect of the south, the Fezzan, by successive governments in Tripoli, both during and after the Gaddafi dictatorship. This has spawned the Fezzan Rage movement which is demanding its region be sent adequate supplies of fuel, money for cash-strapped banks, the final commissioning of a power station in Obari to alleviate widespread electricity outages and the reopening of local airports.

Serraj promised the protestors that he would meet their demands, and even though he has made and failed to keep similar promises in the past, the Sharara field blockaders appeared to accept these renewed assurances. However, the PC head’s intervention incensed NOC chief Sanalla, who takes the view that caving in over this action would only encourage more aggrieved groups to seize oil installations elsewhere.

There have been two reasons for Sanalla’s remarkable success. The first is that he has been extremely careful to remain apolitical — taking the view that it is his job simply to protect and enhance his country’s oil income for the benefit of all its citizens. The second is that for the political rivals and their lethal militia supporters, Sanalla and his people at NOC are the geese that lay the golden eggs, which almost all the various factions are busy plundering through fraud, extortion and blackmail. With most foreign oilmen having fled the violence, the protection of NOC’s handful of highly competent specialists is a priority for every warlord.

Hafter’s is the largest and most successful military presence. His Libya National Army drove terrorists and their Muslim Brotherhood sponsors out of Benghazi. It then took back the long-shut Oil Crescent export terminals from an MB ally, Ibrahim Jadhran, whose blockade of oil sales, said Sanalla, had cost Libya $100 billion in lost revenues. If the LNA now manages to gain and keep stable control in the south of two of the country’s biggest fields, NOC will put them back into production.

Hafter’s troops would however only be protecting the fields, not exploiting them. The international community insists only NOC can trade and sell Libyan oil and gas. Nevertheless, controlling the vast majority of the country’s oil and gas fields, would likely enhance Hafter’s pitch for the presidency, as and when an election is held.