The death toll from Monday’s attack on sleeping Pakistani police and Frontier Force cadets seems bound to rise from the initial 60 figure that was given. More than 117 were injured, many of them grievously.
Daesh (the self-proclaimed IS) has said it was responsible for the crime but the government in Islamabad is asserting that the murders were carried out by a local terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. The attackers, some reports say there were three of them wearing suicide vests and others that there were six, all died when police and army units retook the police academy on the outskirts of the western city of Quetta after a four-hour siege.
This assault was cowardly and callous. For the terrorists who planned it, it will seem a triumph. For the injured and for the mourning relatives of the victims, it is a tragedy that threatens to plunge Pakistan deeper into brutal civil strife.
There are, however, serious questions to be answered by the local security forces. This was by no means the first time that the police college, which normally takes around 700 cadets at a time, has been attacked. In 2006, six policemen were killed when explosive devices smuggled into the college were detonated simultaneously. Two years later, the college was subjected to a rocket attack that caused extensive damage but only injuries to the policemen inside.
On this basis, security at the facility ought to have been on the highest level. On Monday, the terrorists opened their attacking by firing on a watchtower and killing the guard. They were then able to blast their way inside and the carnage began.
After the 2006 assault, local commanders vowed that security would be tightened. It was never discovered how the five devices, based on land mines, had been smuggled into the academy. The perpetrators of the 2008 rocket attack were never caught and no credible claim for the crime was ever made.
No doubt the police and army will be looking at how what were supposed to be good defenses were breached with such apparent ease. On most well-run military or paramilitary facilities, there is always a small contingent drawn from among the occupants who perform overnight guard duty. While sentries may actually be patrolling the perimeter or in watchtowers, the guard is held at a central point ready to be turned out in an emergency or if a senior officer arrives. Either a guardhouse arrangement was not in place or it simply did not work on Monday. Had the camp been properly run, these fanatics would not have got far before they were stopped.
This highlights two of the strongest weapons that the terrorists have, which are complacency and boredom. The terror gangs choose their moment to strike. As in Peshawar, it was fully eight years after their last attack. In such circumstances, those responsible for security can become lax.
Guards staring at the same old piece of ground, the same approach road day after day, become bored. Messaging friends on a phone helps pass the time. Vigilance weakens and sometimes even collapses completely. It may seem a harsh judgment, but the police and Frontier Force cadets victims in Peshawar almost certainly suffered because of inadequate procedures put in place by their commanders coupled with poor intelligence from further up the command chain.
