If Iraq’s armed forces are to recapture Ramadi, and the fall appears imminent, it would be one of the most important victories for the government since Daesh (the self-proclaimed IS) took a third of the country last year. Iraq, backed up by air support from an international coalition led by the United States, sees the battle for Ramadi as a testing ground for a future assault on Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city and Daesh’s main stronghold where in 2014 it declared a caliphate to rule over all Muslims.
Though the offensive in Ramadi began less than a week ago, the city should have been retaken even quicker. Standing in the way are only an estimated 100 to 125 remaining militants who have planted mines and improvised explosive devices, while taking an undetermined number of civilians as human shields.
That an inconsequential number of Daesh fighters is holding up against the Iraqi army is as puzzling as last year’s Daesh offensive which steamrolled over the country’s military. In June 2014, the terror group seized control of Ramadi in a blitz attack, putting the security forces to flight in a spectacular show of strength. As Daesh overran the city, the remaining soldiers discarded their weapons and fled their posts leaving behind huge quantities of weapons and equipment worth millions of dollars.
The imbroglio stunned the world and most Iraqis with many of them wondering how a military of hundreds of thousands that cost the treasury nearly half the national budget could have been defeated by a small, poorly equipped and barely funded foe.
Deep sectarianism and infighting within the ranks of the Iraqi army were the main reasons behind the disaster. Rampant corruption, inefficiency and sectarianism produced an entirely dysfunctional and demoralized military.
Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, who was also commander-in-chief of the armed forces at the time, refused to take responsibility or order an investigation. Unabashed, he fought a bitter battle to stay in power after April’s election, despite strong opposition to his bid for a third term.
Al-Maliki’s successor, Haider Al-Abadi, had to clean up this inherited mess. He began to purge the security forces of corrupt and incompetent officers. He fired dozens of officers and announced the discovery and removal of 50,000 “ghost army” soldiers from the payrolls.
Another positive element from the Iraqi army’s disintegration is that the Daesh advances in Iraq prompted US President Barack Obama to abandon his policy of non-interference in Iraq and re-engage in the war-torn country both militarily and politically. He immediately ordered air strikes against Daesh and unveiled a strategy to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the militant group. The plan also called for arming a Sunni force including members of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s army to fight against Daesh and help stabilize the Sunni-dominated provinces. This approach also entailed efforts to allow Sunnis a bigger say in the Baghdad government and some provincial autonomy.
Efforts to launch national reconciliation and ensure a broader participation of Sunnis in the government and security forces was a demand made by Sunni politicians to participate in Al-Abadi’s government and to join in fighting Daesh. That demand has to an extent been met. Along with an Iraqi army retrained and re-equipped by the US, the joint military and political plan coalesced into the imminent fall of Ramadi.
But Daesh fighters have had more than 18 months to establish themselves in Mosul since storming the city in the summer of last year, building defenses including land mines and tunnels. Given the Iraqi army’s frustrations in Ramadi, any plans to retake the much larger Mosul will prove more challenging.
