The so-called Hannibal Directive allows Israeli soldiers to fire at enemy forces attempting to abduct their colleagues, even if that risks killing the Israeli soldier rather than him being captured by the enemy. The logic behind the protocol is to prevent the kidnapping of soldiers by the enemy only to use them as bargaining chips in the future. One example is Gilad Shalit who was captured in Gaza by Hamas in 2006 and released in 2011 in exchange for over 1,000 Palestinian prisoners. Shalit triggered intense public debate about the policy, but it will no longer be an issue. Israel's army chief has now revoked the decades-old directive.
Many commanders in the field believe that in such cases of an Israeli officer dead or alive, protocol is one thing and practice another. In their eyes, to avoid a repeat of the Shalit affair — that is, Israeli concessions — it would be better if the abductee were killed at the time of capture. According to the directive, it is permissible to open fire to thwart abductions, even at risk to a soldier’s life, but not with the aim of killing them so they won't be taken alive.
The nuances are difficult to grasp but should not be finessed too much. There are other people to think of, not just the soldier. What of civilian life? The Hannibal question arose mainly during the events of “Black Friday” surrounding the capture in the 2014 Gaza war of Israeli officer Hadar Goldin by Hamas. On that Aug. 1 the Israeli military bombarded Rafah with almost every mode of destruction available to it, from F-16 missiles to Apache rockets to naval shelling to drone strikes and mortars. Bulldozers ripped down homes at random while tanks barreled through neighborhoods, shelling anything in sight.
When the Israeli army executed the Hannibal Directive in Rafah, it not only targeted the area where Goldin was supposedly captured but leveled massive firepower against a civilian population over large swaths of a densely populated city of 350,000. By the time it was over, heavy Israeli bombing in 'retaliation' for the capture of Goldin had killed at least 135 Palestinian civilians, including 75 children, one of the biggest massacres of Israel’s 51-day attack on the Gaza Strip. It was later determined that Goldin died during the incident.
Only a few Israeli public figures criticized the military’s behavior. There was little fallout for Benjamin Netanyahu and his inner circle who could rest assured that they had denied Hamas the leverage it might have gained at the negotiating table with a live soldier in its possession.
The Hannibal directive was employed with full force, and in a manner that raises questions concerning two sensitive issues, one for Israelis and one for Palestinians: Was the firepower meant only to affect Goldin’s rescue, or did it in fact endanger his life? Second — and this is not a question — the extent of the Palestinian casualties resulting from the force that was brought to bear in the effort to extricate Goldin was disproportionate. The IDF says the assault was intended to prevent the officer from being used as a negotiating chip like Shalit but the fire was indiscriminate and killed scores of civilians.
The Hannibal Directive is being revoked apparently because Israeli soldiers and commanders had for decades misunderstood the directive as ordering the execution of a soldier to prevent his abduction. The directive left too much room for interpretation by troops on the ground. But the vague policy was also interpreted by soldiers as a justification for indiscriminate shooting and massive Palestinian civilian casualties.
Hannibal has sparked ethical debates within Israeli society because of its soldiers although in those same households it should also have been a target for serious criticism because of Palestinian civilians.
