David Dumke

EVEN critics will concede that the challenges Barack Obama inherited in early 2009 were daunting. Two major and seemingly endless wars, both started in the haze of September 11, needed to end. The US global position needed to be re-established. Attention needed to be paid to repairing frayed relations with Europe and Russia, and, as Obama long proclaimed, meeting the challenges of the new century, particularly in Asia. In the Middle East, American policy needed to be adjusted so that it did not focus solely on counterterrorism, but also on unresolved issues including the neglected peace process, Iran, and the balance between stability and change – with many signs pointing to the storm which broke out in earnest in early 2011.



In short, President Obama’s foreign policy agenda was largely set before taking the oath of office. It was to be a largely reactive posture, responding to existing challenges rather than implementing a new, forward-thinking agenda. The few new initiatives the president proffered in the early days of his first term, before re-election concerns and the weak state of the US economy overwhelmed him, were met with mixed results.

A robust trade agenda based on increasing US exports has largely been successful, but not so his effort at relaunching the peace process. On the latter issue, of course, the president was undermined by Benjamin Netanyahu, who effectively made the political price too high for the president, who opted to take his lumps and wait for another day.



Obama succeeded in tackling the Iraq problem, at least in terms of withdrawing US forces. Similarly, his surge in Afghanistan, even if not successful in the long-term, allowed Obama to craft an eventual plan for departure. While the future of Iraq and Afghanistan remain far from bright, the problem of an endless US military involvement has been solved — saving much American blood and treasure in the coming years.



Even if somewhat unfair, his critics’ claim that in the Arab Spring nations Obama has “led from behind” rings largely true. Wisely or not, the president hesitated before belatedly engaging the US military against Muammar Gaddafi – which helped rebels overthrow, capture, and ultimately kill the unpredictable dictator.

Elsewhere in the region, however, the Obama administration has struggled mightily to respond to the overthrow of Tunisia’s Ben Ali and Egypt’s Mubarak, let alone the civil war in Syria.



Seemingly the President was left holding his finger in the air to see how the prevailing winds were blowing before deciding who should stay and who should go. From outside observers, particularly in the region, there was no ideological consistent US policy as to where it would ultimately support democracy and regime change, and where it would opt to stay the course with incumbent governments. There has been much debate as to what the US wants in the region. Some say democracy is the objective, and note the quick US embrace, even with reservations, of new, Islamist-led governments. Others say that US policy remains unchanged and that the US will work with all governments that serve its interests regardless of their form of government.



Confusion is understandable, however, because the US seems uncertain as to what its regional national security interests truly are; whether democracy promotion is truly amenable to protecting those interests (or is in fact one of those interests); what situations justify military intervention; the best use of foreign assistance, and when it is appropriate to opine about another nation’s internal affairs.



It must be remembered, conspiracy theorists aside, that the US had no grand plan for regional change. True, the Bush administration hoped for a democratic domino effect after the invasion of Iraq, or, as Condoleeza Rice put it, “the first pangs of democracy” in the region. But this was rhetoric, not a blueprint for reshaping the region in America’s image.



When demonstrations broke out in Tunisia and Egypt, the White House was as surprised as anyone. It quickly became apparent that the US understanding of what was taking place on the ground was minimal.

As Ben Ali, Mubarak, and Gaddafi fell in rapid succession, the administration’s blindness became clear.

There was no plan of action to shape the course of events, rather a series of small steps undertaken in response to events well out of its control and, in many instances, beyond its understanding. More often than not, it was the media informing the administration, rather than the other way around. And in the age of blogs, Twitter, and electronic messaging, many of the news reports were far from accurate, or painted a narrow if not biased picture of reality.



As the old saying goes, “haste makes waste.” Perhaps it is better that Obama deferred, by choice or circumstance, making the tough decisions until his second term. Given the confusion on the ground, or uncertainly of the objectives of some of the emerging power brokers in nations across the region, perhaps it was better to attempt to implement a series of bite-sized initiatives — minimal assistance here, investment there, military action elsewhere. But these pieces alone do not a complete puzzle make; there remains no blueprint for the region, nor the countries in it.



Now that President Obama has been reelected, it is time for the US to set a policy. It is time to lead from the front, not from the rear, nor continue to go with the flow. This first requires a clear, defined understanding of US national security interests in the region. It requires coherent policies so that the administration’s policy makers know their objectives. It requires clarity so that friend and foe alike understand when and where the US will use carrots and sticks, and what the red lines are which prevent potentially damaging misunderstandings and reduce the likelihood of crisis.



— David Dumke is a veteran consultant on regional policy and American foreign policy