David Dumke
Anyone doubting the resilience of the Egyptian people should take a closer look. After decades of the relatively stable but uninspiring leadership of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt has endured a chaotic two-plus years of purgatory which has featured few demonstrations of leadership. What was once an unending stream of predictability, even after the status quo was no longer tolerable to the masses, has now transformed into continual unpredictability. Egypt today faces enormous challenges politically and economically, and lacks a viable police force to safeguard order. Indeed, it seems that very little stands in the way of a descent into anarchy except the increasingly disgruntled Egyptian people themselves – who somehow continue to defy the odds and muddle on.
Egypt is plagued by a leadership vacuum which is fueling increased anger, apathy and despair among the masses. Despite calls for reform, economic growth, democracy and accountability made by presidential candidates last year, a plan for revitalizing Egypt has neither been articulated nor implemented by the Morsi government. Nor have opposition candidates articulated a vision which promises jobs, safety and a better path forward. While President Mohamed Morsi’s approval ratings have fallen sharply, there is no corresponding rise in support for his many critics.
Perhaps the most lasting legacy of the Mubarak era is the lack of a proficient political class. There seems no leader on the horizon capable of inspiring the mass public support needed to meet the daunting challenges of today, much less maintain the tenuous status quo. The leaders that do exist, namely in the ranks of the ruling Muslim Brotherhood, have demonstrated inexperience even in managing day-to-day affairs such as trash collection or making the trains run on time. Opposition figures, on the other hand, either lack grassroots support, are past their political prime, lack charisma, or are incapable of appealing to common citizens – or all of the above.
The January 25 revolt against Mubarak, sparked by activists but driven to success by Egyptians from all walks of life and ideological perspectives, was a profoundly inspiring demonstration of people power – both to Egyptians and citizens of the world.
But it was also a leaderless revolution, with no clear Lech Walesa-type figure waiting in the wings. It is not that Walesa himself was a great leader in office; he was eventually drummed out of office at the ballot box. However, a single figure or unifying ideological vision is of critical importance in any revolutionary situation. Otherwise, the real revolution follows, or becomes merely a reshuffling of the political order without a change in overall course.
Making matters worse, in the wake of Mubarak’s ousting and the subsequent elections, was the uncertainty of Egypt’s political economy. Many of Egypt’s most prominent businessmen were deemed culpable for the former regime’s ills, particularly the tolerance of corruption and cronyism. And while getting the scalps of some prominent players and reexamining past business deals was understandable, it led many key Egyptian businessmen to flee abroad and sent ominous signals to the international business community. After all, the business elite, for well or ill, served as Egypt’s ambassadors to the world of global commerce.
The Muslim Brotherhood promised the people the Nahda Project to revitalize Egypt in four years. Yet to the dismay of Egyptians, this ill-defined campaign promise now seems to be based on the Spanish word “nada” – a non-plan. The Morsi government’s inability to articulate or implement even basic economic decisions, combined with the appearance that the Brotherhood is most concerned with strengthening its own economic position, has led many Egyptians to conclude that the priority of Egypt’s new leaders is to consolidate power at the expense of national interests.
Of course, there is plenty of blame to go around in today’s Egypt. President Morsi has had to play a weak hand. He inherited a mess, a state in which many tough economic decisions must be made, all of which will produce many losers and few winners in the short term. Egypt, after all, failed for 30 years to fully turn away from Nasserist socialism, opting instead for a series of incremental policy changes that created a viable free market while simultaneously maintaining a socialist state based on a grossly bloated bureaucracy and increasingly costly subsidies covering basic staples of life.
Egypt’s experimentation in supply-side economics had some positive results. The nation has become more accessible to the international market, and lower tariff rates and other such measures have created a more business-friendly environment. It succeeded in creating many new Egyptian millionaires and allowed the middle class to more affordably acquire consumer goods such as household appliances and automobiles. But the new money and economic growth largely failed to trickle down to the masses. Indeed, the have-nots have seen their economic conditions fall along with a steady deterioration of the state-provided social safety net.
Moreover, one can also sympathize with the Brotherhood government because it – unlike the Islamist government of Turkey, for example – had no experience of governing at any level. It is hard enough to master the intricacies of municipal governance, let alone manage an unhealthy national government. Additionally, the continual obstacles presented by political opponents and the independent but unaccountable judiciary has further thrown a wrench into almost every plan.
But this does not excuse avoidable mistakes made by the government. In fact, it amazes many that an organization that built its reputation through symbolism – providing charitable services at the grassroots level – has apparently forgotten the basic tenants of politics. To lead, one must provide leadership and vision and, short of real deliverables, at minimum one must symbolically show people a sense of direction. President Morsi cannot possibly meet the high expectations of the public, but he can continually remind them of where he is trying to lead them – and provide some positive affirmation, through symbolic acts, that he is working on their behalf.
Additionally, the Brotherhood must learn when to pick their fights. It is far easier to win a series of incremental battles than to simultaneously fight a multi-front war. For example, despite the inadequacies of the Egyptian judiciary, now is not the time to overhaul it, because not only does this suggest to Egyptians that the Brotherhood are making a naked power grab, but it also sends signals to a skeptical international community – who can provide the economic help Egypt desperately needs – that the government is not interested in maintaining an inclusive state built on democratic values.
Then there is the growing problem of crime. The police force, largely discredited and hated for its performance in the Mubarak years, has shown little ability or interest in guaranteeing law and order. Crime rates surely are soaring, and it is difficult to find an Egyptian who does not have an appalling story about being victimized personally, or having a family member victimized. Yet nary has there been an act, symbolic or otherwise, suggesting that providing law and order is a priority of the government.
Yet despite ominous news and increasingly gloomy forecasts, Egypt continues to muddle along. This is testament to the Egyptian people, who have endured, often silently, periods of extreme anxiety and suffering throughout their history. This is largely due to national character and because Egyptians from all walks of life still have a sense of national identity and mission. This spirit will likely allow Egypt to endure today’s leadership crisis. Yet the problems persist, and sooner or later Egypt’s leadership void must be filled.
— David Dumke is a veteran consultant on regional policy and American foreign policy
