David Dumke

 

In the growing volumes of Western analysis about what happened in Egypt this last week, one fact is clear: there is little understanding of the Egyptian Armed Forces, their political orientation, and motives.  Knee-jerk assessments dwell far too heavily on instinctive suspicion of military involvement in politics.  This is not specific to Egypt, but to illiberal, heavy-handed  military governance in all corners of the globe.  It has also become almost cliché to cite the Egyptian military’s alleged long-standing dominance of political power in Egypt, and its impulse to protect a supposed vast business empire and the copious perks lavished on its officers.



In part, the misunderstanding of the Egyptian Armed Forces is attributable to the military’s reluctance to show its hand to outsiders.  This is particularly true of Western media and think tanks, which the military has long viewed with suspicion.  As a result, very few individuals are willing to accept that the Egyptian military might not be motivated by self-interest.



The military is the foundation of the modern Egyptian state, but not necessarily because it is power hungry.  Rather, it is the one national institution upon which people can rely, and a symbol of security and unity.  The military’s historical frame of reference and understanding of the concept of citizenship is rooted in the Nasser era.  Military officers consider themselves citizens first and foremost, and are highly sensitive to sectarianism and incitement which divides Egyptians.  With a staunchly statist outlook, they believe that the interests of the state and Egyptian community as a whole supersede ideology or parochial interests.



The military believes it played a difficult but heroic role in the January 25, 2011 demonstrations which ousted Hosni Mubarak.  From their perspective, while underappreciated at home and abroad, they succeeded in amending the constitution, held free and fair elections, and put Egypt on the path to building an inclusive democracy.  That said, the Armed Forces themselves will acknowledge that they made mistakes largely attributable to political inexperience, resulting in the alienation of many political actors and a tarnishing of their reputation.



But valuable lessons were learned, particularly understanding the importance of image, political messaging, and controlling the narrative.  General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi’s team is far more politically savvy and experienced than that which served under retired Field Marshall Mohammed Hussein Tantawi. 



The military’s grievances with Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood largely mirrored those of Egyptian society, albeit with a greater concern about national security and Egypt’s diminishing influence in regional affairs.  But the former president’s chief failing was incompetence.  It is important to note that the military was not motivated out of self-interest, at least in terms of perks and power.  In fact, Morsi attempted to co-opt the military by granting concessions which on paper gave it unprecedented influence.



But the military did not contemplate re-entering the political arena until events forced their hand.  Morsi’s increasing unwillingness to bend coincided with a rise in lawlessness, increased sectarianism, and a flat economy, among other troubling indicators.  But the ultimate reason the military acted was the success of the Tamarod movement, which gathered 22 million signatures and united ideologically diverse political parties and non-partisan citizens alike all opposed to Morsi’s rule. 



Knowing the political importance of controlling the narrative for domestic and international audiences, the military has demonstrated much improved communications skills.  For weeks, they have issued timely statements emphasizing the importance of political compromise and their determination to prevent the collapse of the state. 



Since June 30, the military has provided verbal and visual evidence buttressing its position.  They explained their troop deployments to cities across the country as a commitment to preserve the right of peaceful protest.  Troops on the ground demonstrated their support of the people, which led to pro-military chants, even by activists who vehemently opposed military rule just a year ago.  Their final attempt to force Morsi to offer a roadmap for change suggested a legitimate willingness to preserve the democratic order so long as the collective voice of the people was heard.  Helicopter flybys, done at low altitude and fitted with Egyptian flags, conveyed a message of national unity.



Most notably, however, the military’s success in building a coalition of demonstrators, respected religious authorities, opposition figures and parties, and even the hardline Islamist Salafi Nour Party, offered evidence of their commitment to inclusiveness.  That figures as disparate as the Coptic Pope, Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar, Nour Party leader, Tamarod spokesman, and Nobel Prize winner Mohamed ElBaradei, all declared their support for the military roadmap spoke volumes.



It remains unclear how the Western media will spin the military’s machinations in the coming weeks.  Already there is a great debate about whether this constitutes a coup, and dire warnings about the military’s illiberal inclinations.  Thus far, however, the military’s words, deeds, and messaging have convinced the overwhelming majority of the Egyptian people that it is acting out of benevolence.     

 

— David Dumke is a veteran analyst on US relations with the Middle East and North Africa